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Abstract Dynamic risk processes, which involve interactions at the hazard and risk
levels, have yet to be clearly understood and properly integrated into probabilistic risk
assessment. While much attention has been given to this aspect lately, most studies remain
limited to a small number of site-specific multi-risk scenarios. We present a generic
probabilistic framework based on the sequential Monte Carlo Method to implement
coinciding events and triggered chains of events (using a variant of a Markov chain), as
well as time-variant vulnerability and exposure. We consider generic perils based on
analogies with real ones, natural and man-made. Each simulated time series corresponds to
one risk scenario, and the analysis of multiple time series allows for the probabilistic
assessment of losses and for the recognition of more or less probable risk paths, including
extremes or low-probability–high-consequences chains of events. We find that extreme
events can be captured by adding more knowledge on potential interaction processes using
in a brick-by-brick approach. We introduce the concept of risk migration matrix to evaluate
how multi-risk participates to the emergence of extremes, and we show that risk migration
(i.e., clustering of losses) and risk amplification (i.e., loss amplification at higher losses) are
the two main causes for their occurrence.
Keywords Multi-hazard  Multi-risk  Extreme event  Monte Carlo 
Markov chain
1 Introduction
Multi-risk assessment is still in its infancy and often only refers to the analysis of multiple
single hazards in a same framework (Gru¨nthal et al. 2006; Carpignano et al. 2009; Schmidt
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et al. 2011). Major catastrophes however remind us that multi-risk is not simply the sum of
individual risks but that correlations between natural hazards, technological hazards and
our complex socioeconomic networks lead to greater risks (e.g., 2005 hurricane Katrina,
USA; 2010 eruption of Eyjafjallajo¨kull, Iceland; 2011 Tohoku earthquake, Japan). Inno-
vative methods have been proposed in recent years to tackle the problem of hazard
interactions (e.g., Marzocchi et al. 2012) and of other dynamic aspects of risk, such as
time-dependent vulnerability and exposure (e.g., Selva 2013) or network failures (e.g.,
Adachi and Ellingwood 2008). However, so far, only a limited number of scenario-based
and/or site-specific multi-risk studies have been proposed due to the difficulty and novelty
of the task.
Development of a comprehensive multi-risk framework is hampered by the following
requirements: (1) large amount of input data (2) cross-disciplinary expertise and (3)
innovative risk assessment methods. The first two points are generally solved in dedi-
cated multi-risk projects at the national (e.g., HAZUS-MH, http://www.fema.gov/hazus),
international (e.g., CAPRA, http://www.ecapra.org/) or private sector levels (e.g., Grossi
and Kunreuther 2005; Schmidt et al. 2011). The third point remains to be solved. As
indicated by Kappes et al. (2012), ‘‘despite growing awareness of relations between
hazards, still neither a uniform conceptual approach nor a generally used terminology is
applied’’. Similarly, but based on feedback from civil protection stakeholders, Komen-
dantova et al. (2014) noted that: ‘‘two areas are most problematic. These are (1) the
absence of clear definitions and (2) the lack of information on the added value of multi-
risk assessment’’.
In the present study, we present a novel, generic, multi-risk framework based on the
sequential Monte Carlo Method (MCM) to allow for a straightforward and flexible
implementation of hazard interactions, which may occur in a complex system. Real-world
examples of hazard interactions include: earthquake clustering, storm clustering, tsunamis
following earthquakes or landslides, landslides or fire following earthquakes, storm surges
associated to hurricanes, technological accidents triggered by natural events (i.e., NaTech
events). Time-variant vulnerability and exposure related to hazard clustering are also
considered, although not the primary focus of this study. More generally, time-variant
vulnerability may refer to different processes, such as structure ageing, not-repaired pre-
damage due to past events or damage conditioned on the co-occurrence of several events.
Time-variant exposure supposes the evolution of assets value with time, which may be due
to socioeconomic factors or to previous losses.
Our goal is specifically to capture and quantify extreme (i.e., low-probability–high-
consequences) events using inductive generalization (e.g., Bier et al. 1999) and by fol-
lowing the recommendation of Kameda (2012), which is to ‘‘mobilize ‘‘scientific imagi-
nation’’ in the process of decision’’—by incorporating extreme events in risk modelling if
no observations but sound scientific bases are available (Note that the term ‘‘reasoned
imagination’’ is used by Pate´-Cornell 2012). Our approach differs from site-specific and
scenario-based studies (e.g., Adachi and Ellingwood 2008; Marzocchi et al. 2012; Selva
2013) in that we do not define any specific hazard or risk interaction but a framework to
implement any type of interaction. With such an objective, real interaction processes have
to be abstracted to more basic concepts and engineering methods by-passed. The proposed
framework is described in Sect. 2, in which the concept of hazard correlation matrix is
introduced.
Validation of our framework, which should be considered as a proof-of-concept, is
made using generic data and processes defined heuristically. This strategy, that is the use
of intuitive judgment and simple rules, allows for the solving of problems that are
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otherwise difficult to consider. Based on an extensive literature survey, we generalize the
concepts of peril, of peril characterization and of hazard interaction. Our aim, by
abstracting these concepts into basic categories, is to provide some general guidelines for
extreme event quantification. The proof-of-concept is presented in Sect. 3, and a dis-
cussion on the applicability of the proposed framework to real-world conditions is given
in Sect. 4.
Basic hazard and risk terms as well as definitions used in the present article are based,
when available, on the book ‘‘Catastrophe Modelling: A new approach to managing risk’’
by Grossi and Kunreuther (2005). Symbols used in our study are listed in Table 1.
2 Generic multi-risk framework
2.1 Sequential Monte Carlo Method
The proposed multi-risk framework is formed of a core simulation algorithm based on the
MCM. We adopt the MCM for its flexibility when dealing with complex systems. We
generate Nsim time series, sampling events from a Poisson distribution (homogeneous or
non-homogeneous process). Each time series represents one risk scenario, and the analysis
Table 1 List of the symbols used in the present study
Symbols Description
A, B, C, … Peril identifier
Ai, Bi, Ci, … Stochastic event identifier
i, j, k Increment
n Number of events
Nsim Number of simulations
t Time in the interval Dt = [t0; tmax]
e Time lapse between two correlated events (e  Dt)
k Long-term occurrence rate
kmem Time-variant occurrence rate
b Event frequency–intensity ratio
i Hazard intensity
d Mean damage ratio (i.e., system damage)
l Mean of lognormal vulnerability curve
r Standard deviation of lognormal vulnerability curve
c Calibration factor for conditional vulnerability curve
K System loss
E System exposure
e Reconstruction function
Pr(j|i) Probability of occurrence of event j conditional on event i
a Shape parameter of the lognormal distribution for event repeat
DTij Time shift in occurrence rate of event j due to event i
f Coupling factor
/ Index of dispersion
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of N scenarios allows for the probabilistic assessment of losses and for the recognition of
more or less probable risk paths. These risk paths emerge naturally from the system
implemented in the MCM.
A set of stochastic events is defined as input for the MCM, with each event charac-
terized by an identifier, a long-term occurrence rate k and a loss K. The loss is defined as
K = d E with d the mean damage ratio and E the system exposure. d is derived from the
hazard intensity i with each event being represented by one unique hazard footprint. Each
event is therefore implicitly related to one specific source, e.g., an earthquake related to a
given fault segment, a storm related to a given track (see Sect. 3.1.1 for the definition of a
stochastic event set).
Hazard interactions as well as time-variant exposure and vulnerability represent non-
stationary processes, which require additional inputs (see Sects. 3.1.2, 3.1.3) and a
sequential processing strategy. The proposed sequential MCM is defined as follows:
• Multi-hazard assessment: define the simulation set with simulation identifier, event
identifier and event occurrence time t.
1. Generate Nsim random time series: Sample Nsim sets of events over the time
interval Dt = [t0; tmax] drawn from the Poisson distribution with each stochastic
event i characterized by the long-term rate parameters ki. Affix an occurrence time
t to each event following the random uniform distribution. Record the time series
in the simulation set S0, which represents the null hypothesis H0 of having no
interaction in the system. Fix increment j = 1, which indicates the occurrence of
the first event in the time series.
2. For each of the Nsim simulations, record the characteristics of the jth event, which
occurs at tj, in simulation set S1. Resample events k occurring in the interval [tj;
tmax] if the conditional probability Pr(k|j) exists. This conditional probability is
defined in the hazard correlation matrix, described in Sect. 2.2. Affix tk = tj ? e
with e  Dt. Fix j = j ? 1.
3. Repeat step 2 while tj B tmax.
4. Fix j = 1.
• Multi-risk assessment: update the simulation sets S0 and S1 with event loss K.
5. For each of the Nsim simulations, calculate the mean damage ratio dj due to the jth
event, which is potentially conditional on the occurrence of previous events. The
implementation of time-variant vulnerability is described in Sect. 2.3.
6. For each of the Nsim simulations, calculate the loss Kj due to the jth event, which is
potentially conditional on the occurrence of previous events. The implementation
of time-variant exposure is also described in Sect. 2.3. Record Kj.
7. Repeat steps 5 and 6 while tj B tmax.
Figure 1a illustrates the difference between simulation sets S0 and S1. All simulated
time series in S1 start with the same event as in S0, since changes are only conditional on
the occurrence of previous events. Following an event, changes may or may not occur in S1
depending on the conditional probabilities and the effects of sampling. Once an event is
triggered, the trigger/target pair clusters in time with chains of n events potentially
emerging in the time interval [t, t ? ne]. The impact of time-variant exposure and vul-
nerability on event losses are not represented in Fig. 1a. It should be noted that the
proposed framework for hazard interactions is a variant of a Markov chain. In that view,
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the hazard correlation matrix corresponds to a transition matrix, the conditional proba-
bilities to transition probabilities and events to states.
2.2 Hazard correlation matrix
We introduce the concept of hazard correlation matrix to quantify hazard interactions. It
should be noted that we use a loose definition of the word interaction, as we also refer to
one-way causal effects by this term (noted?). The hazard correlation matrix is illustrated
in Fig. 1b where trigger events are represented in rows i and target/triggered events in
columns j. A given peril P consists of n events Pi with 1 B i B n. Each cell of the square
matrix indicates the 1-to-1 conditional probability of occurrence Pr(j|i) = Pr(Pj|Pi) over Dt,
which is used as input in the MCM. We also consider the n-to-1 conditional probability by
incorporating a memory element to the correlation matrix. Various interaction processes
may be implemented, based on empirical, statistical or physical laws. Those are run in the
background with only the conditional probability represented in the hazard correlation
matrix. However, the memory element is defined such that it can alter the process in the
background by informing it of the sequence of previous events. This is illustrated by
several examples in Sect. 3.1.2. The approach is different from a strict Markov chain in the
fact that it is not memoryless and because the matrix does not require
P
j
Pr jjið Þ ¼ 1 (i.e.,
finite chains of events).
We define various terms (noted in italics) to categorize different types of interactions
based on the concept of hazard correlation matrix: An event repeat is described by
Pi ? Pi, an intra-hazard interaction by Pi ? Pj and an inter-hazard interaction by
Ai ? Bj with A and B two different perils. Moreover, perils can be separated into primary
Fig. 1 Generic multi-risk framework (multi-hazard part). a Sequential MCM: the simulation set S0
represents the null hypothesis H0 of having no interaction in the system, while set S1 represents any multi-
risk hypothesis. Grey rectangles represent different simulated time series. b Concept of hazard correlation
matrix: trigger events are represented in rows i and target/triggered events in columns j. A given peril
P consists of n events Pi with 1 B i B n. Each cell of the square matrix indicates the 1-to-1 conditional
probability of occurrence Pr(Pj|Pi) over Dt, which is used as input in the MCM. The n-to-1 conditional
probability is considered by incorporating a memory element to the correlation matrix. The proposed
approach can be seen as a variant of a Markov chain. See text for details
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perils A when kA [ 0 and secondary perils B when kB = 0 and Pr(B|A) [ 0, with k the
long-term occurrence rate. Invisible events i, which do not yield direct losses, should be
included in the system if they trigger events j that do (case Pr(j|i) [ 0, Ki = 0 and Kj [ 0).
2.3 Time-variant exposure and time-variant vulnerability
Cumulative losses due to the occurrence of successive events cannot exceed the total
exposure E. Time-variant exposure can be defined by.
Ei ¼ E0 
Xi
i¼1
diEi1 þ ei ð1Þ
where E0 the original exposure, Ei the exposure of the system immediately following event
i and ei a function representing the exposure reconstruction up to the occurrence time of
event i. With a time-variant exposure, the event loss also becomes time-variant with
Ki = diEi-1. Two end-members of Eq. 1 are instantaneous reconstruction (i.e., ei =
P
Ki)
with Ei = E0 and no reconstruction (i.e., ei = 0) with 0 B Ei B E0. Both cases are tested
in Sect. 3. Although not considered in the present study, a time-dependent term e(t) could
be added to Eq. 1 to represent system recovery after a disaster and socioeconomic evo-
lution (e.g., increase in wealth/assets with time).
The clustering of events in time may also influence the vulnerability, which can be
described by the conditional mean damage ratio dj|i. The dependence on the trigger event
i may take different forms, independently of the framework developed here. An example of
vulnerability dependence on hazard intensity is given in Sect. 3.1.3. Time-dependent
vulnerability di(t), such as ageing, is not considered.
3 Proof-of-concept
3.1 Generic data and processes
We generate generic data and processes by following the heuristic method and by abstracting
the concepts of peril, of peril characterization and of hazard interaction into basic categories.
Our approach provides some general guidelines for extreme event quantification and a dataset
for testing the generic multi-risk framework described in Sect. 2. It follows the existing
recommendations on extreme event assessment (Bier et al. 1999; Kameda 2012; Pate´-Cornell
2012) by combining inductive generalization and ‘‘scientific imagination’’ to include known
examples of extremes as well as potential ‘‘surprise’’ events in a same framework. We
intentionally do not consider the case of networks (Adachi and Ellingwood 2008). Data and
processes are then implemented in the MCM, and the results analysed in Sects. 3.2 and 3.3. In
the present study, we use Nsim = 10
5, Dt = [t0 = 0; tmax = 1] and e = 0.01. It should be
noted that the numerous assumptions made below are not a requirement of the proposed
multi-risk framework but are working hypotheses for basic testing purposes.
3.1.1 Building a stochastic event set
We first generate a stochastic event set in which each event is defined by an identifier, a
long-term occurrence rate k and a loss K. Let’s consider peril A consisting of nA events Ai
with 1 B i B nA. First, we define the frequency-intensity distribution
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ki ¼ expðbiiÞ ð2Þ
where ii is the hazard intensity of event Ai, ki the long-term occurrence rate of event Ai and
b the exponential law exponent for peril A. Equation 2 applies to numerous perils, such as
earthquakes (Gutenberg and Richter 1944), volcanic eruptions (Simkin and Siebert 1994)
or asteroid impacts (Brown et al. 2002). Second, we estimate the mean damage ratio d of
repair cost to the replacement cost of the system from a vulnerability curve that relates the
susceptibility of the system to the hazard intensity, with 0 (no damage) B d B 1 (total
destruction). We use the cumulative lognormal distribution
di ¼ 1
2
erfc  ln iið Þ  l
r
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
 
ð3Þ
where ii is the hazard intensity and di the mean damage ratio due to event Ai. l and r are,
respectively, the mean and standard deviation of the variable’s logarithm and depend on
the peril and asset response type (see Sect. 3.1.3 for a variable l). Equation 3 is well suited
to describe the typical S-shaped vulnerability curve used in damage assessment for
earthquakes (Fabbrocino et al. 2005), volcanic eruptions (Spence et al. 2005; Zuccaro et al.
2008), winds (Wehner et al. 2010), fluvial floods (Reese and Ramsay 2010), tsunamis
(Srivihok et al. 2012) or asteroid impacts (Mignan et al. 2011). In the present case, we
consider a single-damage state, which is an oversimplification compared to standard risk
assessment. This limitation is discussed in Sect. 4.
Let’s now consider additional perils other than A. Direct comparison of hazards (so-called
joint visualization of multiple hazards) would require the use of a rather subjective hazard
intensity classification scheme (e.g., low–medium–high) (Kappes et al. 2012) since intensity i
differs from one peril to another one (e.g., ground shaking, ash load, inundation depth, wind
speed, bolide energy). Thus, we remove i by combining Eqs. 2 and 3, which yields
di ¼ 1
2
erfc  ln  ln kið Þð Þ  ln bð Þ  l
r
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
 
ð4Þ
Using risk as a common language, we resolve the problem of hazard comparability.
Event loss Ki is then defined by Ki = di E where E = 1 the system exposure. Since a
unique vulnerability curve is used for the full exposure, all losses given in the present study
are mean loss values.
We generate the stochastic event set based on Eq. 4 with 10-4 B ki B 10
-1 in 0.1
increments in the log scale. It follows that 31 events are defined per peril with return periods
varying from 10 to 10,000 years. This applies only to primary perils (here A and B), which
occur spontaneously following Eq. 2. We fix bA = ln(10) and bB = 0.5ln(10) (Fig. 2a).
Perils A and B are analogue to earthquakes and volcanic eruptions for instance. Secondary
perils (here C, D and E), by definition, have a null long-term occurrence rate k = 0 and only
occur following primary events. Examples include tsunamis following earthquakes (Suppasri
et al. 2012), storm surges (Irish et al. 2008) or Natech events (i.e., industrial accidents with
natural hazard triggers, Krausmann et al. 2011). Vulnerability curve parameters (Eq. 3,
Fig. 2b) are fixed such that perils A and B show distinctive risks (i.e., different risk ranking),
with peril A dominating risk at short return periods and peril B dominating risk at long return
periods (Eq. 4, Fig. 2c). We use lA = ln(5), rA = 0.4, lB = ln(6) and rB = 0.1. We define
three events per secondary peril (C1–C3, D1–D3 and E1–E3) and use a same vulnerability step
function such that d1 = 0.01, d2 = 0.1 and d3 = 1 for the 3 perils. Table 2 shows the
resulting stochastic event set, which is used as input in the MCM.
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3.1.2 Populating the hazard correlation matrix
Providing a comprehensive review of hazard interactions is out of the scope of this study.
Such a daunting task was for example described by Gill and Malamud (2012) (see also
Kappes et al. 2012). Here, we describe the principal types of hazard interactions that can be
implemented in the correlation matrix to be used for proof-of-concept of the proposed
multi-risk framework. The proposed hazard correlation matrix is shown in Fig. 3. We
consider the three categories of interactions previously defined: event repeat (e.g., Ai ? Ai;
C ? C), intra-hazard interaction (e.g., Ai ? Aj) and inter-hazard interaction (e.g.,
Ai ? Bj). The effect can be positive (i.e., probability increase) or negative (i.e., probability
decrease),, and temporary or lasting (concept of memory). Table 3 lists the different
combinations defined in Fig. 3 and examples of analogies with real perils. More types of
interactions could be envisioned, as not all possible combinations are described here
(primary vs. secondary/interaction category/effect/memory or not).
Event repeat for primary perils is here described by the lognormal distribution
Fig. 2 Characteristics of the generic primary perils A and B. a Power-law frequency–intensity distributions
with frequency k and intensity i (Eq. 2). b Cumulative lognormal vulnerability curves defined by the mean
damage ratio d as a function of intensity i (Eq. 3). c. Risk curves defined by the mean damage ratio d as a
function of frequency k (Eq. 4). The list of parameters is given in Table 3
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Table 2 Stochastic event set defined as input for the MCM
Event id. k K Event id. k K
A1 0.100000 0.00003 B6 0.031623 0
A2 0.079433 0.00008 B7 0.025119 0
A3 0.063096 0.00018 B8 0.019953 0
A4 0.050119 0.00038 B9 0.015849 0
A5 0.039811 0.00073 B10 0.012589 0
A6 0.031623 0.00131 B11 0.010000 0.00003
A7 0.025119 0.00220 B12 0.007943 0.00018
A8 0.019953 0.00350 B13 0.006310 0.00096
A9 0.015849 0.00532 B14 0.005012 0.00394
A10 0.012589 0.00778 B15 0.003981 0.01283
A11 0.010000 0.01099 B16 0.003162 0.03415
A12 0.007943 0.01505 B17 0.002512 0.07620
A13 0.006310 0.02006 B18 0.001995 0.14608
A14 0.005012 0.02611 B19 0.001585 0.24509
A15 0.003981 0.03326 B20 0.001259 0.36727
A16 0.003162 0.04156 B21 0.001000 0.50000
A17 0.002512 0.05104 B22 0.000794 0.62872
A18 0.001995 0.06173 B23 0.000631 0.74063
A19 0.001585 0.07359 B24 0.000501 0.82986
A20 0.001259 0.08662 B25 0.000398 0.89471
A21 0.001000 0.10079 B26 0.000316 0.93851
A22 0.000794 0.11605 B27 0.000251 0.96593
A23 0.000631 0.13227 B28 0.000200 0.98189
A24 0.000501 0.14948 B29 0.000158 0.99104
A25 0.000398 0.16751 B30 0.000126 0.99564
A26 0.000316 0.18634 B31 0.000100 0.99799
A27 0.000251 0.20581 C1 0 0.01
A28 0.000200 0.22559 C2 0 0.1
A29 0.000158 0.24661 C3 0 1
A30 0.000126 0.26717 D1 0 0.01
A31 0.000100 0.28847 D2 0 0.1
B1 0.100000 0 D3 0 1
B2 0.079433 0 E1 0 0.01
B3 0.063096 0 E2 0 0.1
B4 0.050119 0 E3 0 1
B5 0.039811 0
Each event is defined by its identifier, long-term occurrence rate k (relative to Dt) and expected loss K.
Values for primary perils (A and B) are obtained from Eq. 4. Secondary perils (C, D and E) have a long-term
rate k = 0 by definition. The system exposure is fixed to E = 1
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Pr AijAið Þ ¼ r
tmax
t0
1
t
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
2pa2i
p exp ðln tð Þ  1=kiÞ
2
2a2i
 !
dt ð5Þ
where ki is the long-term occurrence rate of event Ai and ai = 1 the shape. In Eq. 5, the
probability over Dt is very low immediately following t0 for Dt  1/ki and progressively
increases through time. It hence represents a renewal process in which energy is first
released by an event and then accumulates gradually through time due to a loading process.
It applies for example to earthquakes, which occurrence is controlled by tectonic loading
(Parsons 2005). We apply Eq. 5 to perils A and B, which significantly lowers the proba-
bility of occurrence compared to the long-term probability Pr(Ai) = 1 - exp(-ki Dt) for
Dt  1/ki (Fig. 4). Event repeat for secondary perils is described by
Fig. 3 Hazard correlation matrix with examples of potential interactions. Trigger events are represented in
rows i and target/triggered events in columns j. Each cell indicates the 1-to-1 conditional probability of
occurrence Pr(j|i) over Dt. The n-to-1 conditional probability is considered by incorporating a memory
element to the correlation matrix. See Table 3 for an analogy with real perils and real interaction processes
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Pr(Cj|Ci) = Pr(Dj|Di) = Pr(Ej|Ei) = 0, which indicates that a given peril can only occur
once, whether immediately after the event (case of peril C—no memory) or through
Dt (case of perils D and E—with memory) (Fig. 3; Table 3). Peril C is analogue to a
tsunami or storm surge, which can occur anytime the proper trigger occurs, but only once
per triggering. Perils D and E are analogue to technological accidents. If such an accident
yields non-functionality, the same accident cannot occur again if the critical infrastructure
is not repaired. If it were repaired immediately, it would then be in the peril C class
(Table 3). Memory is here defined by the recording of previous instances of event
occurrences.
We consider that primary perils are due to an underlying loading process, as described
previously for repeating events by Eq. 5. In this case, events are advanced or delayed from
a time shift DTij. We define
Pr jjið Þ ¼ 1  expðkj;memDtÞ for i 6¼ j ð6Þ
based on the non-homogenous Poisson process with i the trigger event, j the target event
and
kj;memðupdatedÞ ¼ 1
1=kj;mem þ DTij ð7Þ
DTij [ 0 represents a time delay. kj,mem is updated after each event occurrence j, including
the case i = j, and represents the memory of the process (at t0, kj,mem = kj). The same
Table 3 Characteristics of generic perils and processes and analogy with real ones
Peril Type Parameters Analogy
A Primary bA = ln(10),
lA = ln(5),
rA = 0.4
E.g., earthquake
B bB = 0.5ln(10),
lB = ln(6),
rB = 0.1
E.g., volcanic eruption
C Secondary d1 = 0.01,
d2 = 0.1,
d3 = 1
E.g., tsunami
D E.g., Natech (i.e., technological accident with natural hazard
trigger)
E E.g., technological accident
Category Effect Memory Parameters Analogy
Repeat Pr ; Yes a = 1 E.g., earthquake on same fault
Repeat Pr = 0 Yes – E.g., technological accident on same non-repaired
infrastructure impossible
Repeat Pr = 0 No – E.g., second tsunami after same earthquake impossible
Intra-hazard Pr :; Yes f = 0.1 E.g., earthquakes on different faults
Inter-hazard Pr :; Yes E.g., volcanic eruption ? earthquake
Inter-hazard Pr : Yes – E.g., ? technological accident only if infrastructure
still functional
Inter-hazard Pr : No – E.g., earthquake ? tsunami; hurricane ? storm surge
The different combinations correspond to the ones defined in the hazard correlation matrix shown in Fig. 3
Nat Hazards (2014) 73:1999–2022 2009
123
approach is used in earthquake interaction modelling, which is well established with the
theory of stress transfer (Toda et al. 1998; King 2007). This theory also applies to
earthquake/volcanic eruption interactions (Hill et al. 2002; Eggert and Walter 2009). Here,
we apply Eqs. 6 and 7 to intra-hazard interactions (Ai ? Aj; Bi ? Bj) and to inter-hazard
interactions (Ai ? Bj; Bi ? Aj) (Fig. 2). We define the matrix DTij = ± f/ki where f an ad
hoc coupling factor, such that the time shift due to event i is proportional to the return
period of this event (i.e., a rare large event will have a greater effect than a small, more
common, event). Since the spatial relationship between different events is not considered,
we simply fix the sign of DTij randomly for each target event j. We fix f = 0.1 (the role of
different values is discussed in Sect. 3.3).
Secondary perils occur based on the following one-way causal effects: A ? C, C ? D
and D ? E (Fig. 3). Hence, we can produce the domino effect A ? C ? D ? E. We
consider a linear relationship between trigger event i and target event j, such that
jðiÞ ¼ nj  1
ni  1 i  1ð Þ þ 1 ð8Þ
where ni and nj are the number of stochastic events i and j, respectively. This is described
in Fig. 5a for the cases A ? C and C ? D (same for D ? E). It shows that for any event
i, in the range [1, ni], there is an associated event j in the range [1, nj]. Using a relationship
between event increments is however artificial. For real perils, the relationship would
normally relate hazard intensities ii to ij. Examples include the relationship
h = 3.10-5M6.2344 between tsunami height h and earthquake magnitude M (Suppasri et al.
2012) or the relationship between storm surge height and maximum wind speed, as defined
in the Saffir–Simpson hurricane scale (e.g., Irish et al. 2008). Such simple relationships are
Fig. 4 Probability of occurrence Pr(Ai|Ai) of a repeating event based on the lognormal probability
distribution (Eq. 5) compared to the Poisson probability distribution
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controversial, since effects depend on site conditions. The concepts remain however valid
at a more abstract level. In the generic case presented here, we relate event increments
directly for sake of simplicity. To determine the conditional probability Pr(j|i), we assume
a binomial distribution
Pr kjið Þ ¼ nj!
k! nj  k
 
!
jðiÞ
nj
 k
1  jðiÞ
nj
 njk
ð9Þ
where 0 B k B nj. k = j except for the case k = 0, which corresponds to the probability of
having no event triggered Pr(Ø|i). Pr(k|i) is shown in Fig. 5b. Note that the higher the
trigger increment i is (i.e., proxy to hazard intensity), the greater is the probability of
triggering a severe target event j; which is a direct consequence of Eq. 8.
3.1.3 Considering time-variant vulnerability
Hazard clustering may also influence the vulnerability of the system. One example, which
has recently been considered, is the increase in vulnerability to ground shaking due to
increased structural load following an ash fall (Zuccaro et al. 2008; Selva 2013). Another
well-known case is the increased vulnerability of structures to successive shakings during
an earthquake cluster (Jalayer et al. 2010). Here, we consider the conditional vulnerability
curve
Fig. 5 Conditional probability of occurrence of secondary perils Pr(C|A) and Pr(D|C). a Ad hoc linear
relationship between trigger increment i and target increment j (i.e., proxy to hazard intensity, Eq. 8).
b Conditional probabilities defined from a binomial distribution (Eq. 9) based on Eq. 8. See text for details
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djji ¼ 1
2
erfc  ln ij
  ljji
rj
ﬃﬃﬃ
2
p
 !
ð10Þ
where dj|i the mean damage ratio due to event j conditional on the occurrence of event i and
lj|i = lj - cln(ii). ii and ij are the hazard intensities of events i and j, respectively, and c is
an ad hoc calibration parameter. The proposed generic relationship is based on the idea that
the higher the intensity ii is, the greater is the vulnerability to event j. The validity of such
formulation remains to be verified with the logarithmic term here only proposed for
consistency within Eq. 10. For real data, a different relationship may be obtained empir-
ically or from structural engineering (Zuccaro et al. 2008; Jalayer et al. 2010). Here, we
apply Eq. 10 to perils A and B for the case dA|B where c = 0.3. Figure 6 shows the
vulnerability curve linked to peril A conditional on the occurrence of events B1 to B31. This
process is analogue to increased vulnerability to earthquake shaking due to the occurrence
of a volcanic eruption with ash fall (Zuccaro et al. 2008; Selva 2013).
3.2 Definition of extremes
Extreme events may be defined as events, which are ‘‘rare, severe and outside the normal
range of experience of the system in question’’ (Bier et al. 1999). This definition however
assumes that extreme events are somewhat anomalous. In this line of reasoning, quanti-
fication of extremes would make them normal, i.e., non-extreme. In the present study,
extreme events are simply defined as low-probability–high-consequences events, whether
they seem normal or abnormal. Here, extremes do not only refer to individual events, but
also to groups of events of which only the overall impact is considered. Therefore, the
Fig. 6 Vulnerability curve of peril A conditional on the occurrence of peril B. The curve shifts to higher
damage for a same hazard intensity iA with the intensity iB increasing (Eq. 10)
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definition of an event remains blurry and depends on the level considered in the system
(i.e., an event may be composed of sub-events and a meta-event of events). Then, extremes
are categorized into individual events (Sect. 3.2.1) and multiple events, i.e., coinciding
events or triggered chains of events (Sect. 3.2.2).
In recent years, anomalous events, or outliers, have been repackaged into fancier ani-
mals, some of which made their way into popular culture. Taleb (2007) coined the term
‘‘black swan’’ to describe rare events, which in principle cannot be anticipated. Another
popular term is ‘‘perfect storm’’, which refers to an event resulting of a rare combination of
circumstances (Pate´-Cornell, 2012). Finally, the concept of ‘‘dragon king’’ introduced by
Sornette and Ouillon (2012) explains that outliers are due to a physical mechanism not
represented in the distribution tail considered. These different terms are not used in the
present study.
3.2.1 Individual extreme events: concept of heavy tail
Let’s first consider the role of individual events on the overall risk. Figure 7 shows the
metric kiKi. (loss over Dt) for events i characterized by their long-term occurrence rate ki
and loss Ki (Table 2). A related metric is the annual average loss (AAL). As described in
Sect. 3.1.1, peril A dominates the risk at higher frequencies, while peril B dominates at
lower frequencies. The highest loss over period Dt is due to event A15 (at k = 0.0039) for
peril A and to event B21 (at k = 0.0010) for peril B. We see that although we consider most
of the risk in our stochastic event set, we miss a non-negligible part below k = 10-4. It is
common practice in insurance industry to only consider risk scenarios with a return period
that does not exceed 1,000 years (Smolka 2006). In our example and with Dt = 1 year, we
would miss most of the risk using such an arbitrary choice (grey area in Fig. 7). This
illustrates the concept of heavy tail from which extremes are populated. This tail is
however bounded whether by the maximum possible event size (e.g., concept of earth-
quake maximum magnitude in seismic hazard assessment) or by the exposure (i.e., loss
saturation).
Rare unknown perils could also contribute to overall risk, showing the potential
instability of the risk process, as any added information on possible extreme events could
significantly, if not dramatically, alter the risk measure (Fig. 7). The level of knowledge on
extreme individual events is directly linked to the length of the available records (Smolka
2006). New approaches, such as the study of myths (Piccardi and Masse 2007) or of odd
geomorphological structures (e.g., Scheffers et al. 2012) within the scope of scientific
imagination, should help improving these records and reassess the overall risk. This is
however out of the scope of the present study.
3.2.2 Coinciding events and triggered chains of events
Implementation and evaluation of coinciding events and triggered chains of events is the
main purpose of this work. Coinciding events are independent events, which occur in
cluster by chance. Such behaviour is in principle trivial to treat (if all events are known—
see previous section), since it emerges naturally from the Poisson process. This is illus-
trated in Fig. 8 where the distribution of the number of event occurrences k per simulation
for simulation set S0 (homogeneous Poisson process, null hypothesis H0) is shown in light
grey. With the event rate ktot =
P
k = 0.97 (Table 2), we find for instance that the
probability of having k = 5 events occurring during the same simulation is
Pr(k = 5) * 0.003. Large sets of coinciding events are however controlled by the
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moderate-size events with low return periods. More damaging events are rarer and their
random co-occurrence even rarer.
Chains of events are the result of interaction processes. This means that their clustering
is non-random. Here we consider chains of events by adding knowledge to the system by
implementing the generic interaction processes described in Sects. 2.2 (hazard contribu-
tion) and 2.3 (risk contribution). We test four different hypotheses H1 to H4 (four simu-
lation sets S1 to S4), as defined in Table 4. These what-if scenarios are as follows: primary
peril interactions between events of type A and B (H1); primary peril interactions and time-
variant vulnerability linked to the clustering of events of type A and B (H2); primary and
secondary peril interactions (including A ? C ? D ? E chains) and time-variant vul-
nerability (H3); and finally, primary and secondary peril interactions, time-variant vul-
nerability and time-variant exposure (i.e., no reconstruction) (H4). All these hypotheses are
based on the data and processes defined in Sect. 3.1. Results are discussed below.
3.3 Emergence of extremes
3.3.1 Risk migration
In hypothesis H1, events from perils A and B interact following the rules described pre-
viously (Fig. 3; Eqs. 6–7). The number of events per simulation is compared to the one
expected in the null hypothesis H0 in Fig. 8. Using the akaike information criterion (AIC),
we find that the number of event occurrences k per simulation for simulation set S1 (in dark
Fig. 7 Metric kiKi (loss over Dt) for events i characterized by their long-term occurrence rate ki and loss Ki
(Table 2). Using an arbitrary minimum rate in risk assessment, e.g., k C 10-3, may yield an underestimation
of the risk. Rare unknown perils could also contribute to overall risk, showing the potential instability of the
risk process, as any added information on possible extreme events could significantly, if not dramatically,
alter the risk measure. Here, an ad hoc kiKi distribution is shown to illustrate the potential role of an
unknown peril
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grey) is better described by the negative binomial distribution than by the Poisson distri-
bution, which indicates over-dispersion (i.e., clustering of events). Here, we use a coupling
factor f = 0.1 (see Sect. 3.1.2 for the definition of f), which gives the index of dispersion
(variance/mean ratio) / = 4.7. 0 \/ \ 1 represents under-dispersion and / [ 1 over-
dispersion. A higher f yields a higher /, more coupling yielding more clustering. Let’s note
that one could directly simulate risk scenarios by sampling from the negative binomial
distribution instead of from the Poisson distribution in step 1 of the MCM and by not
applying steps 2–3 (see Sect. 2.1). This approach applies when clustering is not due to
event interactions but to a higher-level process. The negative binomial distribution is
frequently used in storm modelling for instance (Mailier et al. 2006; Vitolo et al. 2009).
This is however not tested in the present study.
In Fig. 8, the probability of having k = 5 events is Pr(k = 5) * 0.04 in set S1 in
contrast with Pr(k = 5) * 0.003 in set S0. For k = 7, Pr(k = 7) * 0.02 in set S1 while
Fig. 8 Probability distribution of the number of events k per simulation showing the migration of risk to
lower-probability–higher-consequences meta-events when hazard interactions are considered. Definition of
hypotheses H0 and H1 is given in Table 4
Table 4 List of tested hypotheses H
H Primary peril
interactions
Secondary peril
interactions
Time-variant
vulnerability
Time-variant
exposure
H0 9 9 9 9
H1 4 9 9 9
H2 4 9 4 9
H3 4 4 4 9
H4 4 4 4 4
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Pr(k = 7) * 0.0004 in set S0. With Nsim = 10
5, we find a maximum number of events per
simulation kmax = 7 in set S0 and kmax = 41 in set S1. For hypothesis H3, in which the
domino effect A ? C ? D ? E is added (Fig. 3), the index of dispersion increases to /
= 7.0, and we get Pr(k = 5) * 0.05, Pr(k = 7) * 0.03 and kmax = 49 in set S3. This
demonstrates that risk migrates to lower-probability–higher-consequences events when
hazard interactions are considered. Here, we talk about meta-events, the term consequence
being defined as the aggregated loss over the k events of the cluster (assuming in a first
time a homogeneous distribution of losses K over k).
3.3.2 Risk amplification
As defined in Sect. 3.1.2, the time advance or delay DTij of events j due to a given trigger
i increases with the trigger intensity i (for perils A and B—hypothesis H1). Therefore, the
rarer the event is, the stronger is the associated clustering and the higher is the aggregated
loss. Similarly, the higher the intensity i of a trigger is, the higher is the probability of a
larger secondary event (for perils C, D and E; Fig. 5—hypothesis H3). Finally, the higher
the intensity of peril B is, the higher the loss due to peril A is (Fig. 6—hypothesis H2). This
is illustrated in Fig. 9, which shows the mean aggregated losses (Fig. 9a) and the median
aggregated losses (Fig. 9b) observed in simulations where the largest event from peril A is
Ai. We find that by adding more information on the dynamic risk process, losses tend to be
amplified with increasing risk. We can fit the increase in aggregated losses by a power-law
relationship with exponent 2.9 and 3.6 for mean and median aggregated losses, respec-
tively. In comparison, the power-law exponent is 2.7 for individual event losses (with
Ki * 3.10
-5i2.7). This indicates a phenomenon of risk amplification for low-probability–
high-consequences events.
Fig. 9 Aggregated losses as a function of maximum event size Ai showing the amplification of risk at
greater risk levels. Definition of hypotheses H1 to H3 is given in Table 4. a Mean aggregated losses;
b median aggregated losses
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Let’s finally remark that aggregated losses saturate to
P
K = E0 = 1 in hypothesis H4
if the exposure is not reconstructed after a loss. Moreover, the renewal process of event
repeats limits the number of occurrences of any given event (Figs. 3, 4; hypotheses H1 and
H3). Such processes counteract risk amplification and avoid the emergence of exploding
chain reactions. Since the data and processes defined in Sect. 3.1 were carefully selected to
be representative of existing perils and interactions based on an extensive survey of the
literature, our results (risk migration and amplification) are believed to represent some
common characteristics of multi-risk. It is evident that both aspects strongly depend on site
conditions and that only the analysis of real sites will permit to determine the real impact of
multi-risk. We have demonstrated that the proposed framework could be used for such a
task.
3.3.3 A multi-risk metric: the risk migration matrix
We can evaluate the role of multi-risk in the emergence of extremes using two different
standard metrics: the exceedance probability (EP) curve (e.g., Grossi et al. 2005; Smolka
2006) and the risk matrix (Cox 1998; Krausmann et al. 2011). Both are different repre-
sentations of the relationship between event frequency and event loss (in the present study,
between frequency of meta-events and aggregated loss). Figure 10 shows EP curves of the
five different simulation sets (Table 4). We see the progressive increase in the area below
the curve and the tail becoming fatter when more information on the risk process is added.
We also see the case of a bounded EP at
P
K = E0 = 1. However, such a metric provides
only limited information on the extreme events that populate the tail of the EP curve.
In contrast, the risk matrix provides a more visual representation of the risk although the
colour code, from green (minimum risk) to red (maximum risk) (Krausmann et al. 2011),
Fig. 10 Exceedance probability (EP) curves for the five hypotheses H0 to H4 defined in Table 4
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remains subjective (Fig. 11, top left). We populate the risk matrix with the risk scenarios or
risk paths generated in the different simulation sets. Each simulation is characterized by an
aggregated loss, which represents one risk scenario. The number of times N the same
aggregated loss is observed gives the frequency N/Nsim of this risk scenario. Here,
aggregated losses are binned into 0.01 cells in the log scale (i.e., 501 different values in the
loss interval 10-4 B K B 10). Each risk scenario is then represented by a point in the risk
matrix (Fig. 11). Using a smaller bin would shift all values to lower frequencies, but the
observed patterns would remain the same. This approach should therefore be considered as
semi-quantitative.
To better evaluate the role of multi-risk in the emergence of extremes, we introduce the
notion of risk migration matrix, which is shown in Fig. 11. It is defined as the difference in
the density of risk scenarios observed between two hypotheses. To avoid a pixellated
result, the densities are first calculated using a Gaussian kernel, here with a standard
deviation large enough to focus on the first-order migration patterns. The right column
shows the case Hi - H0, and the left column shows the case Hi - Hi-1 with i the
hypothesis number (Table 4). Risk scenarios of the first and second hypotheses are rep-
resented by white and black points, respectively. An increase in risk is represented in red
and a decrease in blue. The proposed approach allows us to visualize how the risk migrates
as a function of frequency and aggregated losses when new information is added to the
system. From H0 to H3, we see a progressive shift of the risk to higher frequencies and
higher losses (from yellow to red), indicating that the risk is underestimated when inter-
actions at the hazard and risk levels are not considered. The shift is particularly pronounced
in the case of domino effects with A ? C ? D ? E. Finally, the risk migration matrix
H4 - H3 shows how time-dependent exposure yields a saturation of losses. Feedback from
civil protection stakeholders also showed that a risk matrix view might be preferable to the
use of loss curves for communicating multi-risk results. This is in the context of this
feedback that the concept of risk migration matrix was developed (Komendantova et al.
2014).
4 Applicability to real-world conditions
We have presented a novel, generic and flexible multi-risk framework, which implements
coinciding events, triggered chains of events, time-variant vulnerability and time-variant
exposure. While the sequential MCM is a well-established method to model complex
systems, it is still rarely used as the basis of a multi-risk assessment tool. Figure 12 shows
the difference between standard risk modelling (e.g., Grossi et al. 2005) and the newly
proposed approach (Sect. 2). Application of the approach to real test sites will require two
improvements: (1) a data switch with the transition from generic to real data and processes,
which will be the subject of a companion manuscript by the same authors: ‘‘The Quan-
tification of Low-Probability–High-Consequences Events: Part II. Guidelines to Multi-Risk
Assessment Based on the Virtual City Concept’’ and (2) an integration of engineering
models that are in use in existing risk tools (e.g., moving from a single-damage state
equation (Eq. 3) to more realistic multi-damage states as described for instance in
Fig. 11 Risk migration matrices showing how risk migrates as a function of frequency and aggregated
losses when new information is added to the system. Risk increase is represented in red and risk decrease in
blue. Risk scenarios are represented by points, in white for the first hypothesis and in black for the second.
See text for details
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Lagomarsino and Giovinazzi 2006). This second requirement is non-trivial, not only due to
the different modelling structure, but also to the use here of a stochastic event set instead of
aggregated hazard. Aggregated hazard is used for instance in standard seismic risk
assessment (e.g., Cornell 1968) and in its recent multi-risk extensions (Marzocchi et al.
2012; Selva 2013). Nonetheless, moving to an event-based sequential simulation approach
seems appropriate to model dynamic risk processes and extremes.
Testing of the proposed multi-risk framework has been made possible thanks to the
heuristic method and the definition of generic perils and processes, which is based on the
idea of ‘‘scientific imagination’’ (Kameda 2012; Pate´-Cornell 2012). We have shown that
the hazard correlation matrix, by adding knowledge of potential interaction processes,
allows for the capture of low-probability–high-consequences events. In particular, we have
shown the role of risk migration and of risk amplification for their occurrence. The present
work should be seen as a proof-of-concept as we did not attend to fully resolve the difficult
problem of extremes. We only considered a selected number of possible interactions, but
while the chains of events that emerge in the system may seem obvious, adding more perils
and more interactions will yield more complex risk patterns. We thus recommend a brick-
by-brick approach to the modelling of multi-risk, to progressively reduce epistemic
uncertainties. A more realistic modelling of low-probability–high-consequences events
will also require the consideration of additional aspects, such as uncertainties (e.g., Barker
and Haimes 2009), domino effects in socioeconomic networks (e.g., Adachi and Elling-
wood 2008; Buldyrev et al. 2010) and long-term processes (Grossi and Kunreuther 2005;
Smolka 2006), such as climate change (Garcin et al. 2008), infrastructure ageing (Rao et al.
2010) and exposure changes (Bilham 2009). While the concepts developed in the present
study can suggest the theoretical benefits of multi-risk assessment, identifying their real-
world practicality will require the application of the proposed framework to real test sites.
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Fig. 12 Structure difference between standard risk modelling (following Grossi et al. 2005) and the newly
proposed multi-risk approach. MCM refers to the sequential MCM defined in Sect. 2
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